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Conventional firewalls rely on topology restrictions and controlled
network entry points to enforce traffic filtering. Furthermore, a
firewall cannot filter traffic it does not see, so, effectively, every-
one on the protected side is trusted. While this model has worked
well for small to medium size networks, networking trends such as
increased connectivity, higher line speeds, extranets, and telecom-
muting threaten to make it obsolete.
To address the shortcomings of traditional firewalls, the concept
of a “distributed firewall” has been proposed. In this scheme, secu-
rity policy is still centrally defined, but enforcement is left up to the
individual endpoints. IPsec may be used to distribute credentials
that express parts of the overall network policy. Alternately, these
credentials may be obtained through out-of-band means.
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of a
distributed firewall using the KeyNote trust management system
to specify, distribute, and resolve policy, and OpenBSD, an open
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1. INTRODUCTION
A firewall is a collection of components, interposed between two
networks, that filters traffic between them according to some secu-
rity policy [8]. Conventional firewalls rely on network topology
restrictions to perform this filtering. Furthermore, one key assump-
tion under this model is that everyone on the protected network(s)
is trusted (since internal traffic is not seen by the firewall, it cannot
be filtered); if that is not the case, then additional, internal firewalls
have to be deployed in the internal network.
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While this model worked well for small to medium size net-
works, several trends in networking threaten to make it obsolete:
 Due to the increasing line speeds and the more computation-
intensive protocols that a firewall must support (especially
IPsec 1 [13]), firewalls tend to become congestion points.
This gap between processing and networking speeds is likely
to increase, at least for the foreseeable future; while comput-
ers (and hence firewalls) are getting faster, the combination
of more complex protocols and the tremendous increase in
the amount of data that must be passed through the firewall
has been and likely will continue to outpace Moore’s Law
[10].
 There exist protocols, and new protocols are designed, that
are difficult to process at the firewall, because the latter lacks
certain knowledge that is readily available at the endpoints.
FTP and RealAudio are two such protocols. Although there
exist application-level proxies that handle such protocols, such
solutions are viewed as architecturally “unclean” and in some
cases too invasive.
 The assumption that all insiders are trusted 2 has not been
valid for a long time. Specific individuals or remote networks
may be allowed access to all or parts of the protected infras-
tructure (extranets, telecommuting, etc.). Consequently, the
traditional notion of a security perimeter can no longer hold
unmodified; for example, it is desirable that telecommuters’
systems comply with the corporate security policy.
 Worse yet, it has become trivial for anyone to establish a new,
unauthorized entry point to the network without the admin-
istrator’s knowledge and consent. Various forms of tunnels,
wireless, and dial-up access methods allow individuals to es-
tablish backdoor access that bypasses all the security mecha-
nisms provided by traditional firewalls. While firewalls are in
general not intended to guard against misbehavior by insid-
ers, there is a tension between internal needs for more con-
nectivity and the difficulty of satisfying such needs with a
centralized firewall.

IPsec is a protocol suite, recently standardized by the IETF, that
provides network-layer security services such as packet confiden-
tiality, authentication, data integrity, replay protection, and auto-
mated key management.
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This is an artifact of firewall deployment: internal traffic that is
not seen by the firewall cannot be filtered; as a result, internal users
can mount attacks on other users and networks without the firewall
being able to intervene. If firewalls were placed everywhere, this
would not be necessary.
 Large (and even not-so-large) networks today tend to have
a large number of entry points (for performance, failover,
and other reasons). Furthermore, many sites employ inter-
nal firewalls to provide some form of compartmentalization.
This makes administration particularly difficult, both from a
practical point of view and with regard to policy consistency,
since no unified and comprehensive management mechanism
exists.
 End-to-end encryption can also be a threat to firewalls [3], as
it prevents them from looking at the packet fields necessary
to do filtering. Allowing end-to-end encryption through a
firewall implies considerable trust to the users on behalf of
the administrators.
 Finally, there is an increasing need for finer-grained (and
even application-specific) access control which standard fire-
walls cannot readily accommodate without greatly increas-
ing their complexity and processing requirements.
Despite their shortcomings, firewalls are still useful in providing
some measure of security. The key reason that firewalls are still
useful is that they provide an obvious, mostly hassle-free, mecha-
nism for enforcing network security policy. For legacy applications
and networks, they are the only mechanism for security. While
newer protocols typically have some provisions for security3, older
protocols (and their implementations) are more difficult, often im-
possible, to secure. Furthermore, firewalls provide a convenient
first-level barrier that allows quick responses to newly-discovered
bugs.
To address the shortcomings of firewalls while retaining their ad-
vantages, [3] proposed the concept of a distributed firewall. In dis-
tributed firewalls, security policy is defined centrally but enforced
at each invididual network endpoint (hosts, routers, etc.). The sys-
tem propagates the central policy to all endpoints. Policy distri-
bution may take various forms. For example, it may be pushed
directly to the end systems that have to enforce it, or it may be
provided to the users in the form of credentials that they use when
trying to communicate with the hosts, or it may be a combination
of both. The extent of mutual trust between endpoints is specified
by the policy.
To implement a distributed firewall, three components are neces-
sary:
 A language for expressing policies and resolving requests. In
their simplest form, policies in a distributed firewall are func-
tionally equivalent to packet filtering rules. However, it is
desirable to use an extensible system (so other types of appli-
cations and security checks can be specified and enforced in
the future). The language and resolution mechanism should
also support credentials, for delegation of rights and authen-
tication purposes [4].
 A mechanism for safely distributing security policies. This
may be the IPsec key management protocol when possible,
or some other protocol. The integrity of the policies trans-
fered must be guaranteed, either through the communication
protocol or as part of the policy object description ( e.g., they
may be digitally signed).
 A mechanism that applies the security policy to incoming
packets or connections, providing the enforcement part.

This is by no means a universal trait, and even today there are
protocols designed with no security review.
Our prototype implementation uses the KeyNote trust-management
system, which provides a single, extensible language for express-
ing policies and credentials. Credentials in KeyNote are signed,
thus simple file-transfer protocols may be used for policy distribu-
tion. We also make use of the IPsec stack in the OpenBSD system
to authenticate users, protect traffic, and distribute credentials. The
distribution of credentials and user authentication occurs are part of
the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [12] negotiation. Alternatively,
policies may be distributed from a central location when a policy
update is performed, or they may be fetched as-needed (from a web
server, X.500 directory, or through some other protocol).
Since KeyNote allows delegation, decentralized administration
becomes feasible (establishing a hierarchy or web of administra-
tion, for the different departments or even individual systems). Users
are also able to delegate authority to access machines or services
they themselves have access to. Although this may initially seem
counter-intuitive (after all, firewalls embody the concept of central-
ized control), in our experience users can almost always 4 bypass
a firewall’s filtering mechanisms, usually by the most insecure and
destructive way possible ( e.g., giving away their password, setting
up a proxy or login server on some other port, etc.). Thus, it is bet-
ter to allow for some flexibility in the system, as long as the users
follow the overall policy. Also note that it is possible to “turn off”
delegation.
Thus, the overall security policy relevant to a particular user
and a particular end host is the composition of the security policy
“pushed” to the end host, any credentials given to the user, and any
credentials stored in a central location and retrieved on-demand.
Finally, we implement the mechanism that enforces the security
policy in a TCP-connection granularity. In our implementation, the
mechanism is split in two parts, one residing in the kernel and the
other in a user-level process.
1.1 Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the distributed firewall concept and related issues. Sec-
tion 3 gives an overview of the KeyNote trust-management system,
which we use for policy specification and processing. Section 4
discusses the current implementation of the distributed firewall, and
section 5 describes future development. Section 6 presents some re-
lated work. Section 7 summarizes how distributed firewalls address
the problems of traditional firewalls, and concludes this paper.
2. THE DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL
A distributed firewall, of the type described in [3], uses a central
policy, but pushes enforcement towards the edges. That is, the pol-
icy defines what connectivity, inbound and outbound, is permitted;
this policy is distributed to all endpoints, which enforce it.
In the full-blown version, endpoints are characterized by their
IPsec identity, typically in the form of a certificate. Rather than
relying on the topological notions of “inside” and “outside”, as is
done by a traditional firewall, a distributed firewall assigns certain
rights to whichever machines own the private keys corresponding
to certain public keys. Thus, the right to connect to the http port
on a company’s internal Web server might be granted to those ma-
chines having a certificate name of the form *.goodfolks.org,
rather than those machines that happen to be connected to an inter-
nal wire. A laptop directly connected to the Internet has the same
level of protection as does a desktop in the organization’s facility.
Conversely, a laptop connected to the corporate net by a visitor
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With the possible exception of military-grade systems or net-
works.
would not have the proper credentials, and hence would be denied
access, even though it is topologically “inside.”
To implement a distributed firewall, we need a security policy
language that can describe which connections are acceptable, an
authentication mechanism, and a policy distribution scheme. As a
policy specification language, we use the KeyNote trust-management
system, further described in Section 3.
As an authentication mechanism, we decided to use IPsec for
traffic protection and user/host authentication. While we can, in
principle, use application-specific security mechanisms ( e.g., SSL-
enabled web-browsing), this would require extensive modifications
of all such applications to make them aware of the filtering mech-
anism. Furthermore, we would then depend on the good behavior
of the very applications we are trying to protect. Finally, it would
be impossible to secure legacy applications with inadequate provi-
sioning for security.
When it comes to policy distribution, we have a number of choices:
 We can distribute the KeyNote (or other) credentials to the
various end users. The users can then deliver their creden-
tials to the end hosts through the IKE protocol. The users do
not have to be online for the policy update; rather, they can
periodically retrieve the credentials from a repository (such
as a web server). Since the credentials are signed and can be
transmitted over an insecure connection, users could retrieve
their new credentials even when the old ones have expired.
This approach also prevents, or at least mitigates, the effects
of some possible denial of service attacks.
 The credentials can be pushed directly to the end hosts, where
they would be immediately available to the policy verifier.
Since every host would need a large number, if not all, of
the credentials for every user, the storage and transmission
bandwidth requirements are higher than in the previous case.
 The credentials can be placed in a repository where they can
be fetched as needed by the hosts. This requires constant
availability of the repository, and may impose some delays
in the resolution of request (such as a TCP connection estab-
lishment).
While the first case is probably the most attractive from an engi-
neering point of view, not all IKE implementations support distri-
bution of KeyNote credentials. Furthermore, some IPsec imple-
mentations do not support connection-grained security. Finally,
since IPsec is not (yet) in wide use, it is desirable to allow for a
policy-based filtering that does not depend on IPsec. Thus, it is
necessary to provide a policy resolution mechanism that takes into
consideration the connection parameters, the local policies, and any
available credentials (retrieved through IPsec or other means), and
determines whether the connection should be allowed. We describe
our implementation of such a mechanism for the OpenBSD system
in Section 4.
3. KEYNOTE
Trust Management is a relatively new approach to solving the
authorization and security policy problem, and was introduced in
[6]. Making use of public key cryptography for authentication, trust
management dispenses with unique names as an indirect means for
performing access control. Instead, it uses a direct binding between
a public key and a set of authorizations, as represented by a safe
programming language. This results in an inherently decentral-
ized authorization system with sufficient expressibility to guarantee
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Figure 1: Application Interactions with KeyNote. The Re-
quester is typically a user that authenticates through some
application-dependent protocol, and optionally provides cre-
dentials. The Verifier needs to determine whether the Re-
quester is allowed to perform the requested action. It is re-
sponsible for providing to KeyNote all the necessary informa-
tion, the local policy, and any credentials. It is also responsible
for acting upon KeyNote’s response.
One instance of a trust-management system is KeyNote. KeyNote
provides a simple notation for specifying both local security poli-
cies and credentials that can be sent over an untrusted network.
Policies and credentials contain predicates that describe the trusted
actions permitted by the holders of specific public keys (otherwise
known as principals). Signed credentials, which serve the role of
“certificates,” have the same syntax as policy assertions, but are
also signed by the entity delegating the trust. For more details on
the KeyNote language itself, see [5].
Applications communicate with a “KeyNote evaluator” that in-
terprets KeyNote assertions and returns results to applications, as
shown in Figure 1. However, different hosts and environments may
provide a variety of interfaces to the KeyNote evaluator (library,
UNIX daemon, kernel service, etc.).
A KeyNote evaluator accepts as input a set of local policy and
credential assertions, and a set of attributes, called an “action envi-
ronment,” that describes a proposed trusted action associated with
a set of public keys (the requesting principals). The KeyNote eval-
uator determines whether proposed actions are consistent with lo-
cal policy by applying the assertion predicates to the action en-
vironment. The KeyNote evaluator can return values other than
simply true and false, depending on the application and the action-
environment definition. An important concept in KeyNote (and,
more generally, in trust management) is “monotonicity”. This sim-
ply means that given a set of credentials associated with a request,
if there is any subset that would cause the request to be approved
then the complete set will also cause the request to be approved.
This greatly simplifies both request resolution (even in the presence
of conflicts) and credential management. Monotonicity is enforced
by the KeyNote language (it is not possible to write non-monotonic
policies).
It is worth noting here that although KeyNote uses cryptographic
keys as principal identifiers, other types of identifiers may also be
used. For example, usernames may be used to identify principals
inside a host. In this environment, delegation must be controlled by
the operating system (or some implicitly trusted application), sim-
ilar to the mechanisms used for transfering credentials in Unix or
in capability-based systems. Also, in the absence of cryptographic
authentication, the identifier of the principal requesting an action
must be securely established. In the example of a single host, the




Comment: Allow Licensee to connect to local port 23 (telnet) from
internal addresses only, or to port 22 (ssh) from anywhere.
Since this is a policy, no signature field is required.
Conditions: (local_port == "23" && protocol == "tcp" &&
remote_address > "158.130.006.000" &&
remote_address < "158.130.007.255) -> "true";
local_port == "22" && protocol == "tcp" -> "true";
KeyNote-Version: 2
Authorizer: "rsa-hex:1023abcd"
Licensees: "dsa-hex:986512a1" || "x509-base64:19abcd02=="
Comment: Authorizer delegates SSH connection access to either
of the Licensees, if coming from a specific address.
Conditions: (remote_address == "139.091.001.001" &&
local_port == "22") -> "true";
Signature: "rsa-md5-hex:f00f5673"
Figure 2: Example KeyNote Policy and Credential. The local policy allows a particular user (as identified by their public key) connect
access to the telnet port by internal addresses, or to the SSH port from any address. That user then delegates to two other users
(keys) the right to connect to SSH from one specific address. Note that the first key can effectively delegate at most the same rights it
possesses. KeyNote does not allow rights amplification; any delegation acts as refinement.
In our prototype, end hosts (as identified by their IP address) are
also considered principals when IPsec is not used to secure com-
munications. This allows local policies or credentials issued by
administrative5 keys to specify policies similar to current packet fil-
tering rules. Naturally, such policies or credentials implicitly trust
the validity of an IP address as an identifier. In that respect, they
are equivalent to standard packet filtering. The only known solution
to this is the use of cryptographic protocols to secure communica-
tions.
Since KeyNote allows multiple policy constraints, potentially for
different applications, to be contained in the same assertion, it is
trivial to support application-specific credentials. Credentials that
specify, e.g., Java applet permissions, could be delivered under any
of the distribution schemes described in Section 2, and made avail-
able to the end application through some OS-specific mechanism (
e.g., getsockopt(2) calls).
In the context of the distributed firewall, KeyNote allows us to
use the same, simple language for both policy and credentials. The
latter, being signed, may be distributed over an insecure communi-
cation channel. In KeyNote, credentials may be considered as an
extension, or refinement, of local policy; the union of all policy and
credential assertions is the overall network security policy. Alter-
nately, credentials may be viewed as parts of a hypothetical access
matrix. End hosts may specify their own security policies, or they
may depend exclusively on credentials from the administrator, or
do anything in between these two ends of the spectrum. Perhaps of
more interest, it is possible to “merge” policies from different ad-
ministrative entities and process them unambiguously, or to layer
them in increasing levels of refinement. This merging can be ex-
pressed in the KeyNote language, in the form of intersection (con-
junction) and union (disjunction) of the component sub-policies.
Although KeyNote uses a human-readable format and it is indeed
possible to write credentials and policies that way, our ultimate goal
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Note that from the point of view of KeyNote, all keys are “born”
equivalent. The distinction between “administrative” and other
keys lies only in the amount of trust placed on them by the local
policies of end hosts.
is to use it as an interoperability-layer language that “ties together”
the various applications that need access control services. An ad-
ministrator would use a higher-level language ( e.g., [2]) or GUI
to specify correspondingly higher-level policy and then have this
compiled to a set of KeyNote credentials. This higher-level lan-
guage would provide grouping mechanisms and network-specific
abstractions (for networks, hosts, services, etc.) that are not present
in KeyNote. Using KeyNote as the middle language offers a num-
ber of benefits:
 It can handle a variety of different applications (since it is
application-independent but customizable), allowing for more
comprehensive and mixed-level policies ( e.g., covering email,
active code content, IPsec, etc.).
 Provides built-in delegation, thus allowing for decentralized
administration.
 Allows for incremental or localized policy updates (as only
the relevant credentials need to be modified, produced, or
revoked).
Figure 2 shows two sample KeyNote assertions, a policy and a
(signed) credential. Figure 3 shows an example of a key delegating
to an IP address. For more details on KeyNote, see [5, 7].
4. IMPLEMENTATION
For our development platform we decided to use the OpenBSD
operating system [11]. OpenBSD provides an attractive platform
for developing security applications because of the well-integrated
security features and libraries (an IPsec stack, SSL, KeyNote, etc.).
However, similar implementations are possible under other operat-
ing systems.
Our system is comprised of three components: a set of kernel
extensions, which implement the enforcement mechanisms, a user
level daemon process, which implements the distributed firewall
policies, and a device driver, which is used for two-way commu-




Conditions: (@remote_port < 1024 &&
@local_port == 22) -> "true";
Signature: "rsa-sha1-hex:bee11984"
Figure 3: An example credential where an (administrative) key
delegates to an IP address. This would allow the specified ad-
dress to connect to the local SSH port, if the connection is com-
ing from a privileged port. Since the remote host has no way
of supplying the credential to the distributed firewall through a
security protocol like IPsec, the distributed firewall must search
for such credentials or must be provided with them when policy
is generated/updated.
implementation totals approximately 1150 lines of C code; each















Figure 4: The Figure shows a graphical representation of the
system, with all its components. The core of the enforce-
ment mechanism lives in kernel space and is comprised of the
two modified system calls that interest us, connect(2) and
accept(2). The policy specification and processing unit lives
in user space inside the policy daemon process. The two units
communicate via a loadable pseudo device driver interface.
Messages travel from the system call layer to the user level dae-
mon and back using the policy context queue.
Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the system, with all
its components. In the following three subsections we describe the
various parts of the architecture, their functionality, and how they
interact with each other.
4.1 Kernel Extensions
For our working prototype we focused our efforts on the control
of the TCP connections. Similar principles can be applied to other
protocols; for unreliable protocols, some form of reply caching is
desirable to improve performance. We discuss a more general ap-
proach in Section 5.
In the UNIX operating system users create outgoing and allow
incoming TCP connections using the connect(2) and accept(2)
system calls respectively. Since any user has access to these system
calls, some “filtering” mechanism is needed. This filtering should
be based on a policy that is set by the administrator.
Filters can be implemented either in user space or inside the ker-
nel. Each has its advantages and disadvantages.
A user level approach, as depicted in Figure 5, requires each ap-
plication of interest to be linked with a library that provides the
required security mechanisms, e.g.,, a modified libc. This has
the advantage of operating system-independence, and thus does not
require any changes to the kernel code. However, such a scheme
does not guarantee that the applications will use the modified li-







Figure 5: Wrappers for filtering the connect(2) and
accept(2) system calls are added to a system library. While
this approach offers considerable flexibility, it suffers from its
inability to guarantee the enforcement of security policies, as
applications might not link with the appropriate library.
A kernel level approach, as shown in the left side of Figure 4, re-
quires modifications to the operating system kernel. This restricts
us to open source operating systems like BSD and Linux. The main
advantage of this approach is that the additional security mecha-
nisms can be enforced transparently on the applications.
As we mentioned previously, the two system calls we need to
filter are connect(2) and accept(2). When a connect(2)
is issued by a user application and the call traps into the kernel, we
create what we call a policy context (see Figure 6), associated with
that connection.
The policy context is a container for all the information related to
that specific connection. We associate a sequence number to each
such context and then we start filling it with all the information
the policy daemon will need to decide whether to permit it or not.
In the case of the connect(2), this includes the ID of the user
that initiated the connection, the destination address and port, etc.
Any credentials acquired through IPsec may also be added to the
context at this stage. There is no limit as to the kind or amount of
information we can associate with a context. We can, for example,
include the time of day or the number of other open connections of
that user, if we want them to be considered by our decision–making
strategy.
Once all the information is in place, we commit that context. The
commit operation adds the context to the list of contexts the policy
daemon needs to handle. After this, the application is blocked wait-
ing for the policy daemon reply.
Accepting a connection works in a similar fashion. When accept(2)
enters the kernel, it blocks until an incoming connection request ar-
rives. Upon receipt, we allocate a new context which we fill in
similarly to the connect(2) case. The only difference is that
we now also include the source address and port. The context is
















void policy_add_int(policy_context *, char *, int);
void policy_add_string(policy_context *, char *, char *);
void policy_add_ipv4addr(policy_context *, char *, in_addr_t *);
Figure 6: The connect(2) and accept(2) system calls create contexts which contain information relevant to that connection.
These are appended to a queue from which the policy daemon will receive and process them. The policy daemon will then return to
the kernel a decision on whether to accept or deny the connection.
then enqueued, and the process blocks waiting for a reply from the
policy daemon.
In the next section we discuss how messages are passed between
the kernel and the policy daemon.
4.2 Policy Device
To maximize the flexibility of our system and allow for easy ex-
perimentation, we decided to make the policy daemon a user level
process. To support this architecture, we implemented a pseudo de-
vice driver, /dev/policy, that serves as a communication path
between the user–space policy daemon, and the modified system
calls in the kernel. Our device driver supports the usual operations
(open(2), close(2),read(2), write(2), and ioctl(2)).
Furthermore, we have implemented the device driver as a loadable
module. This increases the functionality of our system even more,
since we can add functionality dynamically, without needing to re-
compile the whole kernel.
If no policy daemon has opened /dev/policy, no connection
filtering is done. Opening the device activates the distributed fire-
wall and initializes data structures. All subsequent connect(2)
and accept(2) calls will go through the procedure described in
the previous section. Closing the device will free any allocated re-
sources and disable the distributed firewall.
When reading from the device the policy daemon blocks until
there are requests to be served. The policy daemon handles the pol-
icy resolution messages from the kernel, and writes back a reply.
The write(2) is responsible for returning the policy daemons
decision to the blocked connection call, and then waking it up. It
should be noted that both the device and the associated messaging
protocol are not tied to any particular type of application, and may
in fact be used without any modifications by other kernel compo-
nents that require similar security policy handling.
Finally, we have included an ioctl(2) call for “house–keeping”.
This allows the kernel and the policy daemon to re–synchronize in
case of any errors in creating or parsing the request messages, by
discarding the current policy context and dropping the associated
connection.
4.3 Policy Daemon
The third and last component of our system is the policy daemon.
It is a user level process responsible for making decisions, based
on policies that are specified by some administrator and credentials
retrieved remotely or provided by the kernel, on whether to allow
or deny connections.
Policies, as shown in Figure 2, are initially read in from a file. It
is possible to remove old policies and add new ones dynamically.
In the current implementation, such policy changes only affect new
connections. In Section 5 we will discuss how these changes can
potentially be made to affect existing connections, if such function-
ality is required.
Communication between the policy daemon and the kernel is
possible, as we mentioned earlier, using the policy device. The
daemon receives each request (see Figure 7) from the kernel by
reading the device. The request contains all the information rel-
evant to that connection as described in Section 4.1. Processing
of the request is done by the daemon using the KeyNote library,
and a decision to accept or deny it is reached. Finally the dae-
mon writes the reply back to the kernel and waits for the next re-
quest. While the information received in a particular message is
application-dependent (in our case, relevant to the distributed fire-
wall), the daemon itself has no awareness of the specific applica-
tion. Thus, it can be used to provide policy resolution services for
many different applications, literally without any modifications.
When using a remote repository server, the daemon can fetch a
credential based on the ID of the user associated with a connection,
or with the local or remote IP address (such credentials may look
like the one in Figure 3). A very simple approach to that is fetching
the credentials via HTTP from a remote web server. The creden-
tials are stored by user ID and IP address, and provided to anyone
requesting them. If credential “privacy” is a requirement, one could
secure this connection using IPsec or SSL. To avoid potential dead-
locks, the policy daemon is not subject to the connection filtering
u_int32_t seq; /* Sequence Number */
u_int32_t uid; /* User Id */
u_int32_t N; /* Number of Fields */
u_int32_t l[N]; /* Lengths of Fields */
char *field[N]; /* Fields */
Figure 7: The request to the policy daemon is comprised of the
following fields: a sequence number uniquely identifying the
request, the ID of the user the connection request belongs to,
the number of information fields that will be included in the





Figure 8: End-host local security policy. In our particular sce-
nario, the policy simply states that some administrative key will
specify our policy, in the form of one or more credentials. The
lack of a Conditions field means that there are no restrictions
imposed on the policies specified by the administrative key.
mechanism.
4.4 Example Scenario
To better explain the interaction of the various components in the
distributed firewall, we discuss the course of events during two in-
coming TCP connection requests, one of which is IPsec–protected.
The local host where the connection is coming is part of a dis-
tributed firewall, and has a local policy as shown in Figure 8.
In the case of a connection coming in over IPsec, the remote user
or host will have established an IPsec Security Association with the
local host using IKE. As part of the IKE exchange, a KeyNote cre-
dential as shown in Figure 9 is provided to the local host. Once the
TCP connection is received, the kernel will construct the appropri-
ate context as discussed in Section 4.1. This context will contain
the local and remote IP addresses and ports for the connection, the
fact that the connection is protected by IPsec, the time of day, etc.
This information along with the credential acquired via IPsec will
be passed to the policy daemon. The policy daemon will perform
a KeyNote evaluation using the local policy and the credential, and
will determine whether the connection is authorized or not. In our
case, the positive response will be sent back to the kernel, which
will then permit the TCP connection to proceed. Note that more
credentials may be provided during the IKE negotiation (for exam-
ple, a chain of credentials delegating authority).
If KeyNote does not authorize the connection, the policy daemon
will try to acquire relevant credentials by contacting a remote server
where these are stored. In our current implementation, we use a
web server as the credential repository. In a large-scale network,
a distributed/replicated database could be used instead. The policy
daemon uses the public key of the remote user (when it is known,
i.e., when IPsec is in use) and the IP address of the remote host as
the keys to lookup credentials with; more specifically, credentials
where the user’s public key or the remote host’s address appears in
the Licensees field are retrieved and cached locally (Figure 3 lists
an example credential that refers to an IP address). These are then
used in conjunction with the information provided by the kernel






(app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&





@local_port == 23 &&
encrypted == "yes" &&
authenticated == "yes") -> "true";
Signature: ...
Figure 9: A credential from the administrator to some user,
authorizing that user to establish an IPsec Security Association
(SA) with the local host and to connect to port 23 (telnet) over
that SA. To do this, we use the fact that multiple expressions
can be included in a single KeyNote credential. Since IPsec
also enforces some form of access control on packets, we could
simplify the overall architecture by skipping the security check
for TCP connections coming over an IPsec tunnel. In that case,
we could simply merge the two clauses (the IPsec policy clause
could specify that the specific user may talk to TCP port 23 only
over that SA).
5. FUTURE WORK
There are a number of possible extensions that we plan to work
on in the process of building a more general and complete system.
As part of the STRONGMAN project at the University of Penn-
sylvania, we are examining the application of higher-level security
policy languages to large-scale network management. KeyNote is
used as a common language for expressing policies that can be dis-
tributed in different applications and systems. The distributed fire-
wall is an important component in the STRONGMAN architecture.
This is a subject of ongoing research.
As we described in Section 4.3, the policy daemon runs as a user
level process that communicates with the kernel via a device driver.
This design maximizes the flexibility of our system and allows for
easy experimentation. Unfortunately, it adds the overhead of cross-
domain calls between user space and kernel. An alternate design
would be to run the policy daemon inside the kernel, much like
nfssvc(2). The policy daemon will then have direct access to
the policy context queue, eliminating the system call overhead.
Our current system focuses on controlling TCP connections. We
plan to expand our implementation by adding an IP filter-like mech-
anism for a more fine grained control (perhaps based on some ex-
isting filtering package, like IPF).
This will allow per-packet, as opposed to per-connection, polic-
ing. Apart from protecting applications based on UDP, a packet-
based implementation would also limit the types of “scanning” that
an attacker might perform. In order to avoid the high overhead of
such an approach we plan to use “policy caching.” With policy
caching, we invoke the policy daemon only the first time we en-
counter a new type of packet, e.g., a packet belonging to a new
connection. The decision of the policy daemon may be cached
(subject to policy) in the filtering mechanism, and any other pack-
ets of the same type will be treated accordingly. In the event of a
policy change, we can simply flush the cache. Given the simplicity
of the KeyNote language, it is also possible to statically analyze the
policies and credentials and derive in advance the necessary packet
filtering rules, as a form of pre-caching. This however imposes
greater demands on the credential-distribution mechanism.
We should note here that in our view most communications should
be secured end-to-end (via IPsec or other similar mechanism); thus,
most hosts would have a minimal set of filtering entries established
at boot time. The rest of the rules would be established dynami-
cally through the key exchange (or policy discovery) mechanisms
in IPsec (or equivalent protocol). This approach can potentially
scale much better than initializing or updating packet filters at the
same time policy is updated. The cost of always-encrypted com-
munication is less than one might think: PCI cards that cost less
than US$300 retail (year 2000 prices) can easily achieve 100Mbps
sustained throughput while encrypting/decrypting; there also exist
a number of ethernet cards with built-in support for IPsec, poten-
tially allowing for even higher throughput and much lower cost.
Another point to address is policy updates. As we mentioned in
Section 4.3, we can update the policies of the daemon dynamically.
However, policy updates do not affect already existing connections
in the current implementation. We would like to add a revocation
mechanism that goes through the list of all the connections and
re-applies the policies. Connections that do not comply with the
changes will be terminated by the kernel. One obvious method of
doing so is by adding an ioctl(2) call that notifies the kernel of a
policy update; the kernel then walks the list of TCP connections and
sends a policy resolution request to the policy daemon, pretending
the connection was just initiated. This approach requires minimal
modifications in our existing system.
We have already mentioned that KeyNote may be used to ex-
press application-specific policies, and the relevant credentials may
be distributed over the same channels (IPsec, web server, etc.).
The interaction between application-specific and lower-level (such
as those equivalent to packet filtering) policies is of particular in-
terest, as it is possible to do very fine-grained access control by
appropriately mixing these.
One final point to address is credential discovery. Users need
a way to discover what credentials they (might) need to supply to
the system along with their request for a connection. The policy
daemon can then process these credentials along with the request.
A simple way of adding this capability is by using the already ex-
isting setsockopt(2) system call. These credentials will then
be added to any policy context requests associated with the socket.
6. RELATED WORK
A lot of work has been done over the previous years in the area
of (traditional) firewalls[8, 16, 17].
[19] and [15] describe different approaches to host-based en-
forcement of security policy. These mechanisms depend on the IP
addresses for access control, although they could potentially be ex-
tended to support some credential-based policy mechanism similar
to what we describe in our paper.
The Napoleon system [18] defines a layered group-based access
control scheme that is in some ways similar to the distributed fire-
wall concept we have described, although it is mostly targeted to
RMI environments like CORBA. Policies are compiled to Access
Control Lists (ACLs) appropriate for each application (in our case,
that would be each end host) and pushed out to them at policy cre-
ation or update time.
The STRONGMAN project at the University of Pennsylvania is
aiming at simplifying security policy management by providing an
application-independent policy specification language that can be
compiled to application-specific KeyNote credentials. These cre-
dentials can then be distributed to applications, hosts, and end users
and used in an integrated policy framework.
The Adage/Pledge system uses SSL and X.509-based authenti-
cation to provide applications with a library that allows centralized
rights management.
[1] presents an in-depth discussion of the advantages and disad-
vantages of credential-based access control.
SnareWork [9] is a DCE-based system that can provide transpar-
ent security services (including access control) to end-applications,
through use of wrapper modules that understand the application-
specific protocols. Policies are compiled to ACLs and distributed
to the various hosts in the secured network, although a pull-based
method can also be used. Connections to protected ports are re-
ported to a local security manager which decides whether to drop,
allow, or forward them (using DCE RPC) to a remote host, based
on the ACLs.
Perhaps the most relevant work is that of [2]. The approach there
is use of a “network grouping” language that is customized for each
managed firewall at that firewall. The language used is independent
of the firewalls and routers used. In our approach, we introduce
a three-layer system: a high-level policy language (equivalent in
some sense to that used in Firmato), an intermediate level language
(KeyNote) used by the mechanisms, and the actual mechanisms
enforcing policy. This allows us to:
1. Express multi-application policies, rather than just
packet filtering rules.
2. Express Mixed-layer policies ( e.g., policies of the type “email
has to either be signed in the application layer or delivered
over an IPsec SA that was authenticated with a credential
matching the user in the From field of the email”).
3. Permit delegation, which enables decentralized management
(since KeyNote allows building arbitrary hierarchies of trust).
4. Allows incremental and asynchronous policy updates, since,
when policy changes, only the relevant KeyNote credentials
need to be updated and distributed ( e.g., only those relevant
to a specific firewall).
7. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the concept of a distributed firewall. Under
this scheme, network security policy specification remains under
the control of the network administrator. Its enforcement, however,
is left up to the hosts in the protected network. Security policy is
specified using KeyNote policies and credentials, and is distributed
(through IPsec, a web server, a directory-like mechanism, or some
other protocol) to the users and hosts in the network. Since enforce-
ment occurs at the endpoints, various shortcomings of traditional
firewalls are overcome:
 Security is no longer dependent on restricting the network
topology. This allows considerable flexibility in defining the
“security perimeter,” which can easily be extended to safely
include remote hosts and networks ( e.g., telecommuters, ex-
tranets).
 Since we no longer solely depend on a single firewall for pro-
tection, we eliminate a performance bottleneck. Alternately,
the burden placed on the traditional firewall is lessened sig-
nificantly, since it delegates a lot of the filtering to the end
hosts.
 Filtering of certain protocols ( e.g., FTP) which was difficult
when done on a traditional firewall, becomes significantly
easier, since all the relevant information is present at the de-
cision point, i.e., the end host.
 The number of outside connections the protected network is
no longer a cause for administration nightmares. Adding or
removing links has no impact on the security of the network.
“Backdoor” connections set up by users, either intentionally
or inadvertently, also do not create windows of vulnerability.
 Insiders may no longer be treated as unconditionally trusted.
Network compartmentalization becomes significantly easier.
 End-to-end encryption is made possible without sacrificing
security, as was the case with traditional firewalls. In fact,
end-to-end encryption greatly improves the security of the
distributed firewall.
 Application-specific policies may be made available to end-
applications over the same distribution channel.
 Filtering (and other policy) rules are distributed and estab-
lished on an as-needed basis; that is, only the hosts that ac-
tually need to communicate need to determine what the rel-
evant policy with regard to each other is. This significantly
eases the task of policy updating, and does not require each
host/firewall to maintain the complete set of policies, which
may be very large for large networks ( e.g., the AT&T phone
network). Furthermore, policies and their distribution scales
much better with respect to the network size and user base
than a more tighly-coupled and synchronized approach would.
On the other hand, a distributed firewall architecture requires
high quality administration tools, and de facto places high confi-
dence in them. We believe that this is an inevitable trend however,
even if traditional firewalls are utilized; already, large networks
with a modest number of perimeter firewalls are becoming difficult
to manage manually.
Also, note that the introduction of a distributed firewall infras-
tructure in a network does not completely eliminate the need for a
traditional firewall. The latter is still useful in certain tasks:
 It is easier to counter infrastructure attacks that operate at
a level lower than the distributed firewall. Note that this is
mostly an implementation issue; there is no reason why a
distributed firewall cannot operate at arbitrarily low layers,
other than potential performance degradation.
 Denial-of-service attack mitigation is more effective at the
network ingress points (depending on the particular kind of
attack).
 Intrusion detection systems are more effective when located
at a traditional firewall, where complete traffic information is
available.
 The traditional firewall may protect end hosts that do not (or
cannot) support the distributed firewall mechanisms. Inte-
gration with the policy specification and distribution mecha-
nisms is especially important here, to avoid duplicated filters
and windows of vulnerability.
 Finally, a traditional firewall may simply act as a fail-safe
security mechanism.
Since most of the security enforcement has been moved to the
end hosts, the task of a traditional firewall operating in a distributed
firewall infrastructure is significantly eased. The interactions be-
tween traditional (and, even more interesting, transparent) and dis-
tributed firewalls are a subject for future research.
A final point is that, from an administrative point of view, a fully-
distributed firewall architecture is very similar to a network with a
large number of internal firewalls. The mechanism we have al-
ready described may be used in both environments. The two main
differences between the two approaches lie in the granularity of
“internal” protection (which also depends on the protected subnet
topology, e.g., switched or broadcast) and the end-to-end security
guarantees (better infrastructure support is needed to make IPsec
work through a firewall; alternately, transparent firewalls may be
used [14]).
We have demonstrated the feasibility of the distributed firewall
by building a working prototype. Further experimentation is needed
to determine the robustness, efficiency, and scalability of this archi-
tecture. We hope that our work will stimulate further research in
this area.
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